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Abstract
This thematic issue aims to shed light on different facets of the relationship between division of labour within families and
couples, work–life conflict and family policy. In this afterword, we provide a summary of the contributions by emphasizing
three main aspects in need of further scrutiny: the conceptualisation of labour division within families and couples, the
multilevel structure of relationships and the interactions of gender(ed) values at different levels of exploration.
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1. Introduction
The contributions in this thematic issue show that the
relationship between division of labour within couples,
work–life conflict and family policy is highly complex
by revealing relevant insights on a number of aspects
of this relationship. While there is ample research on
country differences in family policy, on work–life conflict
(and it’s different conceptual colours as work–family con-
flict, work–family conflict, work–life balance, etc.) and on
labour division within families and couples, less is known
on the relationship between the three, especially when it
comes to gender differences. Yet, it is the (gendered) rela-
tionship between those three concepts that needs scien-
tific as well as policy attention because an isolated view
on just one or two of them might miss the connection
to real-life and bias the perspective because the three
are inseparable.
In this concluding commentary, we summarise the
findings of the contributions, pointing to three main as-
pects of the relationship between labour division within
families and couples, work–life conflict and family policy.
We then briefly demonstrate the complexity of the en-
deavour of comparative research regarding this relation-
ship and point out theoretical and methodological lacu-
nae. We conclude by pointing out the main findings of
this thematic issue and their policy implication.
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2. Three Aspects in Need of Scrutiny
Summarising the contributions of this thematic issue, we
want to point out a few aspects that need more atten-
tion in the current scientific and policy discourse: First,
labour division needs a broader conceptualisation includ-
ing care work, also outside the family. Second, the re-
lationships between labour division, work–life conflict
and family policy take place in a multilevel context: The
individual-level (household, class, values), meso-level
(economy: employment, work demands) and macro-
level (region, country: policy and culture) influence how
partners share their work and how this has repercus-
sions onwork–life conflicts.We think that themeso-level
and its interaction with the other levels is particularly
under-researched. Third, values regarding gender roles
and family arrangements as well as attitudes towards
gender inequalities need to be taken into account on all
the three levels including how such values are shaped by
the three levels.
2.1. Conceptualisation of Labour Division within
Families and Couples
As already pointed out in the introduction to this the-
matic issue, there is a lack of precision in the defi-
nition of labour division within families and couples.
The plethora of definitions can be classified on a scale
from very inclusive where all non-paid work within or
outside the household is included blurring the limits
between voluntary and housework (e.g., OECD, 2011,
p. 10) to a very limited perception of non-paid work as
female-attributed housework like dishwashing and clean-
ing (e.g., Hu & Yucel, 2018; Ruppanner, Bernhardt, &
Brandén, 2017). However, the contributions in this the-
matic issue show that it does matter what is included in
the definition of non-paid work and that non-paid work
indeed encompasses different tasks. Bornatici and Heers
(2020) demonstrate how important care work is regard-
ing work–life conflict: When analysing family arrange-
ment according to time spent on all tasks (paid, non-paid
and care work), equal arrangements are associated with
lower work–life conflict. However, when differentiating
between paid, domestic and care work, equally sharing
care work lowers work–life conflict while equally sharing
paid or domestic work does not. Thus, researcherswould
draw the wrong conclusion that equally sharing tasks
is linked to less work–life conflict when in fact, sharing
care work is the main driver. Aidukaite and Telisauskaite-
Cekanavice (2020) reveal that policy can change how
care for children is shared within a family: While the
Swedishmodelwith non-transferable father’s leave leads
to a norm that fathers take a more important role in
child care, Lithuanian policy focusing on financial secu-
rity where fathers can even work during their parental
leave and grandparents can take parental leave to take
over care duties, fathers involve much less in child care.
Moreover, long-term care policies differ across countries
as Bartha and Zentai (2020) demonstrate. The study on
long-time care also puts forward that not only childcare
is a relevant factor in labour division within families but
also care for elderly and disabled. Importantly, paid and
non-paid care work is mostly done by women and is
embedded in hierarchies reflecting power relations be-
tween employers and employees, citizens and migrants
as well as men and women. Paid care allows (mainly)
women to engage in paid work and do less housework.
At the same time, paid care creates opportunities to gain
an independent revenue in care jobs (again mostly taken
by women). However, an achievement of more equal
share of care-duties within a family comes with a grain of
salt when considering the broader context. In countries
where women participate more equally in paid work,
care work is not only sharedmore equally within couples
but also more likely to be outsourced to paid care. This
can lead to gendered job situations in which women take
less-paid jobs in the care sector or the care work is ex-
ternalised to migrants where women from other, poorer
countries take over care work. Due to lack of macro-data
on the share of migrants in paid care, the authors could
not take this factor into account in their model but sug-
gest digging deeper into the potential issue of a new gen-
dering of care through migration, or “global care chain”
(see also Estéves-Abe&Hobson, 2015). Theoretical work,
however, suggests complex relationships because of the
involvement of so-called global families: Migrant women
are not only exploited or climb the ladder when ex-
ploiting other women (Lutz, 2002), they might do low-
paid jobs in Europe but might gain power and inde-
pendency vis-à-vis their partners and families in their
home country (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2011). Such is-
sues need certainlymore theoretical and empirical devel-
opment. The COVID-19 pandemic has shown, however,
that those women (together with informal [male] farm-
ing and restaurant helpers) are the first to be in a very
difficult situation in such a crisis, as the long waiting line
for food parcels in Geneva showed, bringing the infor-
mal sector in one of the world’s richest cities out of the
shadow (Kingsley, 2020).
2.2. Multilevel Structure of Relationships
Second, decisions are taken in a multilevel context.
While the individual level and the country level are
well-researched (however, not always with consistent re-
sults; see Masuda, Sortheix, Beham, & Naidoo, 2019;
Ruppanner, 2011), the meso-level, i.e., the situation at
the workplace and labour market, is less researched
(with the exception of working conditions, e.g., Gallie
& Russell, 2009). Kromydas (2020) shows that educa-
tion, in its mediating role between the individual and
the meso level, plays a complex role regarding the rela-
tionship between division of labour and work–life con-
flict. Higher education can lead to higher work–life con-
flict for women, probably because they do double-shifts
taking the same household duties but having more de-
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manding jobs. On the other hand, higher education can
work as a cushion for women in times of crisis. Women
are more affected by economic crises than men every-
thing held equal, but education reduces this negative ef-
fect. Demand of work force seems to play a role here as
higher educated women seem to have more crisis resis-
tant jobs than lower educated women. In other words,
among highly educated, the difference between men
and women regarding crisis resistant jobs is smaller than
among low educated. Similarly, Ukhova (2020) finds for
the Central and Eastern European countries that in the
higher social class, gender equality has progressed while
in the lower social class it has regressed.
A series of contributions in this thematic issue put for-
ward that preferences in labour division do not always
match with practice (Bornatici & Heers, 2020; Geszler,
2020; Nagy, 2020; Zimmermann & LeGoff, 2020). This
is attributed to restrictions imposed by the work place,
be it the difficulty for men to reduce their work percent-
ages, availability of technical tools to increase flexibility
to be productive during care time or the persistence of
the “ideal employee” norm (Geszler, 2020; Nagy, 2020;
Zimmermann & LeGoff, 2020). There is also an interac-
tion between the meso and the macro level in the sense
that policy can shape values in companies and the eco-
nomic and political situation can turn countries into vic-
tims of globalisation when employers can put pressure
on employees to be evermore committed towork,which
can lead to stronger corporate “colonisation” where em-
ployees can be always reached and work time expands
into private time due to technology (Geszler, 2020; Nagy,
2020; Ukhova, 2020).
2.3. Gender Values and the Interactions of Gender
Values at Different Levels
Third, gender values need to be taken into account, not
only on a macro level but also on the individual and
organisational level (Bornatici & Heers, 2020; Ukhova,
2020; Zimmermann & LeGoff, 2020). Gender values re-
late to how people see the roles of the genders, what
constitutes a family and how it is organised, how an op-
timal labour division within families is seen, etc. Such
values can shape policies (as voters choose representa-
tives sharing their sets of values) and policies can shape
values (by emphasising certain role models over others;
see the case of Sweden’s “daddy leave” in Aidukaite &
Telisauskaite-Cekanavice, 2020). In any case, couples do
not take their decisions on division of labour in a void but
in a multilevel environment, where each level can have
value preferences. On themicro or individual level, some
couples prefer egalitarian arrangements whereas other
couples prefer a traditional family organisation. On the
meso or economic level, employers and the labour mar-
ket can facilitate some arrangements or make them im-
possible to realise (Geszler, 2020; Zimmermann& LeGoff,
2020). Moreover, preferences differ also on the macro
or country level and policy can facilitate more or less
egalitarian models (e.g., policy can grant long maternity
leaves but no parental or paternity leave). Tomake things
more complex, the choice of family arrangement on the
individual level can bemediated by social class as Ukhova
(2020) shows or regional culture as Zimmermann and
LeGoff (2020) point out. Such interactions between the
different levels matter regarding how the family arrange-
ment affects work–life conflict as Bornatici and Heers
(2020) demonstrate: Couples having a consistent mod-
ern traditional arrangement in an egalitarian society ex-
perience higher work–life conflicts while couples having
a consistent egalitarian arrangement in an egalitarian so-
ciety experience the least work–life conflict.
3. Issues for Future Research on Labour Division,
Work–life Conflict and Family Policy
The focus on only these three aspects shows that the
relationships are complex—much more complex than
the current state of theory and operationalisation can
capture. Consequently, there is a need for theoretical
and conceptual development as well as on empirical
and methodological refinement. On the one hand, the
conceptual definitions of labour division within families
and couples need scrutiny: Certainly, care tasks need to
be included and the different levels of care examined.
Furthermore, we need more explicit theories about the
relationships between labour division, work–life conflict
and family policy: How do they interact on the differ-
ent levels on which they are active (individual, economic
and country)? What are the consequences of achieving
a more equal share of paid and non-paid work in cou-
ples? Does this come with gendered work patterns or
even relocation of the gender divide to other world re-
gions? Does the latter rather put migrant women into
dependencies or empower them to be more indepen-
dent (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2011; Lutz, 2002)? Does
technology facilitate a reconciliation between family and
career or rather simply increase corporate colonization
(Nagy, 2020)? Can technology help involve men more
in family matters or is it rather used to increase fe-
male labour participation while keeping them doing the
care work?
Finally, we want to point out a methodological is-
sue we have encountered in the production of this the-
matic issue linked to the complex multilevel structure of
the relationships examined: Hierarchical linearmultilevel
models are the methodological mainstream when re-
searchers tackle concepts affecting different levels (e.g.,
Masuda et al., 2019; Ruppanner, 2011). They mostly
rely on maximum likelihood and assume equal effects
(and variances) on the individual level across countries.
However, when it comes to policy, we cannot assume
equal fixed effects and variances across countries any-
more (Achen, 2005) and when studying policy, we are
usually interested in country-level effects for whichmaxi-
mum likelihoodprovides poor precision (Bowers&Drake,
2005). Therefore, it is not surprising that results from
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such studies are inconclusive or showunexpected results
(as noticed byMasuda et al., 2019). To address this issue,
two-step procedures could be employed that take into
account that effects on the individual level vary across
countries (Achen, 2005; Bowers & Drake, 2005; Bryan
& Jenkins, 2016), for example because of different fam-
ily policies impacting the relationship between division
of labour and work–life conflict. However, such meth-
ods seem to be ignored by most scholars in the field
and false beliefs about multilevel models are prevalent,
for example, if data have a multilevel structure, multi-
level modelling must be applied, as the work on this the-
matic issue showed. None of the articles submitted used
multilevel modelling for the obvious reasons, however,
the reviewers still asked all authors to apply multilevel
modelling. One reason for the dislike of two-step meth-
ods is that the results and study description might look
more complicated than themultilevel model. To improve
the presentation of such models and their acceptance
in the field, we need some methodological and theoret-
ical work to be done: Such varying relationships across
countries are complex and theories for how such differ-
ences could look like are missing, making it very difficult
to come to easily presentable results within the limits of
a journal article.
We therefore want to put forward that rather than
just applying the mainstream method to all research, re-
searchers must reflect on their research question and
choose the appropriate method. We illustrate this point
using a small example.
3.1. Example of the Difference between Multilevel
Models and Two-Step Procedures
Our previous research inciting the idea of this thematic is-
sue at a conference aimed at investigatingwhether a new
vulnerable group regarding work–life conflict emerged
in the context of the economic crisis of 2007 and, us-
ing data from the European Social Survey (ESS) rounds
4 and 8, found that not only the unemployed fall into
difficult situations, but also some working parents can
be seen as a vulnerable group as work demands in-
crease and family demands do not decrease (Ochsner
& Szalma, 2017). For this research, we applied the con-
ventional multilevel model approach as we were in-
vestigating whether, across Europe, a new vulnerable
group emerges. We were thus seeking a general trend in
European countries; moreover, our interest did not lie in
the size of country level predictors. If, however, wewould
aim at identifying whether policies can alleviate work–
life conflict and whether we find differences across fam-
ily policy regimes, we were not interested in a general
pattern at the individual level valid for all countries but
in the differences across countries in how work–life con-
flict comes about. In such a case, the preferred approach
would be a two-step procedure, in which an OLS regres-
sion for each country was calculated in the first step and
in the second step patterns in the coefficients were iden-
tified. Applying such a model as an example to demon-
strate the methodological issue, we find that, using the
same data, the ESS 2010 (ESS, 2012), and the same coun-
try selection, the independent variables’ effects did in-
deed differ considerably across countries. Without go-
ing into detail or trying to interpret results, which would
demand additional efforts for which we do not have
the space, the example shows clearly that the effects
at the individual level vary considerably across countries.
Therefore, as soon as one wishes to investigate country
differences or policy effects, fixed-effects or multilevel
models are inadequate as they blur exactly what one
wants to investigate (for a schematic presentation of ef-
fect sizes, see Figure 1, for the full table and a description
of the variables used, see supplemental material).
However, interpreting such results is quite demand-
ing as patterns are not necessarily straight forward. First
and foremost, we do not have enough detailed theo-
retical knowledge about how policy shapes family ar-
rangements and employers’ decisions and their effect on
work–life conflict to formulate clear hypotheses to test.
Second, there is still only little methodological guidance
on how to explore relationships on the second level with-
out running endless numbers of regressions or generat-
ing visualisations on each coefficient and bringing them
back into a full picture. If wewant to take our understand-
ing of the division of labour within families and couples
to the next level, theoretical and methodological efforts
must bemade to link family policy with division of labour
andwork–life conflict and their interactions on the differ-
ent levels as the relationships do not follow a linear pat-
tern in the sense that generous family policy would lead
to less work–life conflict and a more egalitarian division
of labour (see also Crompton & Lyonette, 2006; Strandh
& Nordenmark, 2006).
4. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations
This thematic issue puts forward a fewpoints relevant for
research and policy with regard to labour division within
families and couples and work–life conflict. We identi-
fied three aspects that need scrutiny: First, labour divi-
sion needs to be conceptualised more broadly and in-
clude care work; second, the multilevel structure needs
to be taken into account, especially at the meso-level –
the economy, the labour market and employers as well
as the restrictions they impose on decision making in
couples; third, values regarding labour division differ and
need to be taken into account at each level.
A perspective taking these three aspects into account
reveals some points relevant to family policy. First, family
policy should be de-gendered. Mostly focussing on im-
proving female labour participation and facilitating the
reconciliation of family and work for women will not
likely be successful in achieving amore egalitarian labour
division in households. Rather, policy must at the same
timework on improving father’s opportunities in taking a
more important role at home (Aidukaite & Telisauskaite-
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Figure 1. Graphical representation of effect size by country group, country and gender.
Cekanavice, 2020; Geszler, 2020; Zimmermann & LeGoff,
2020) and include models enabling parenting and being
successful at work for both genders. Technology can be
a facilitator in reconciling work and family demands but
can have adverse effects if corporate colonisation is not
countered (Nagy, 2020).
Second, families are fragile environments and work–
life conflict is very context-dependent. Vulnerability is
not only linked to a few conditions such as unemploy-
ment or single parenting, but many situations can lead
to issues of work–life conflict and thus family problems,
such as having multiple jobs, both parents working at
unsocial times, trying to live gender equality in a tradi-
tional setting or vice versa etc. (Bornatici & Heers, 2020;
Kromydas, 2020; Ochsner & Szalma, 2017; Ukhova, 2020;
Zimmermann & LeGoff, 2020). Attitudes towards fam-
ily arrangements do not only vary between countries,
but also between regions and social classes (Ukhova,
2020; Zimmermann & LeGoff, 2020). Also, what can
be achieved depends on contexts and it can be more
stressful if the own preference is not congruent with
the general attitude of the population and thus lead
to work–life conflict. Family policy should therefore pro-
pose solutions for reconciliations of work and family for
several arrangements of labour division within families
and couples.
Third, different levels of jobs come with different
problems. Having more autonomy on working hours
might help reconcile work and family demands but this
comes most likely with pressures to be always reach-
able. Tools to counter work–life conflict might differ be-
tween different levels of jobs: While technology might
help managers to keep contact with their family, it
might rather lead to corporate colonisation, i.e., expand-
ing working time into family time, in so-called sand-
wich positions where workers take responsibility but do
not have full autonomy (see Geszler, 2020; Nagy, 2020).
Reconciliation measures should therefore take such dif-
ferent working conditions into account and tools should
be available for all positions, also at the highest level,
both to increase the female share in such positions and
also to enable fathers in such positions to take responsi-
bility in family matters.
Fourth, there is an interaction between policy and
economy. Policies can introduce measures to facilitate
reconciliation of work and family. However, companies
act within those contexts and are aware of policies as
they need to be competitive in the country’s context. The
availability of childcare institutions might facilitate fam-
ily organisation, but it might also lead to higher expecta-
tions of employers towards parents as those parents are
able to outsource family work. Also, companies can use
reputation of reconciliation practices and advertise them
to recruit talent. In practice, however, their approach to-
wards parents might not bemuch different from average
companies as the case of a Swedish company in Hungary
suggests (Geszler, 2020). This has not only implications
for policy makers who should acknowledge and antici-
pate such adaptations, but also on practitioners consult-
ingworkers and families in their coping strategies. Finally,
it is relevant for research on family policy that it should
be more aware of such cross-level interaction effects.
Fifth, a reflection regarding the scientific rather than
the policy discourse, research comparing countries re-
garding family policies should take the different norms
and policies in the examined countries into account and
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should refrain from assuming general effects of policies
across countries. Multilevel modelling should only be
used when its assumptions are tenable. Rather, other
modelling strategies should be applied, especially mod-
els taking country differences of individual level effects
into account, such as two-step approaches.
Finally, we want to put forward that major events on
the macro level, such as the economic crisis in 2007 or
the current COVID-19 pandemic can have a strong im-
pact on labour divisionwithin families and couples. It will
most likely have some effects into the direction of amore
traditional family model, but this might very well differ
more strongly between social classes than in so-called
normal times (see Ukhova, 2020).
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